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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible error in ruling 
that Johnson's claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine and the disclaimer of all 
implied warranties. 
This is an appeal from the trial court's granting of Vermeer's motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim. This Court reviews the trial court's ruling for correctness. Hunter 
v. Sunrise Title Company, 2004 UT r, 84 P.3d 1163, 1165 (Utah 2004). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the issue presented in this 
appeal: 
Section 70A-2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by the Utah 
legislature, provides in relevant part: 
[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or 
any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case 
of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any 
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and 
conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is 
sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties 
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof." 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(2) (2003). 
Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Complete texts of these statutes and rules are provided in the Appendix as Exhibit A. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
C.A. Johnson Trenching, L.C. ("Johnson") purchased a Model T855 Trencher 
from Vermeer Manufacturing Company's ("Vermeer") independent, authorized dealer in 
Salt Lake City, Utah on July 19, 1999. Johnson alleges that the trencher "became wholly 
disabled as a result of a mechanical failure" on September 24, 2002, over three years after 
its purchase. Johnson filed a lawsuit against Vermeer relating to the alleged failure of the 
subject trencher on March 28, 2003. In its Complaint, Johnson asserted claims for strict 
liability, negligence, and breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness 
for a particular purpose. 
On May 13, 2003, Vermeer filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: (1) 
Johnson's strict liability and negligence claims were barred by the economic loss rule; 
and (2) Johnson's breach of implied warranty claim was barred because the implied 
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose were expressly 
disclaimed by Vermeer's Limited Warranty for Industrial Equipment. 
After full briefing, the District Court Judge, Lynn W. Davis, ruled in favor of 
Vermeer and entered an Order Granting Vermeer's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice on 
July 30, 2003. Johnson now appeals from that Order of Dismissal.1 
Johnson appeals the dismissal of its strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims. Johnson does not appeal 
the dismissal of its negligence claim. Accordingly, the negligence claim is not addressed here. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 19, 1999, C.A. Johnson Trenching, L.C. purchased a Model T855 
trencher, Serial No. 102 (the "trencher"), from Vermeer's independent, authorized dealer 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 5). Upon purchasing the trencher, Johnson received 
Vermeer's Limited Warranty for Industrial Equipment ("Limited Warranty"). The 
Limited Warranty provides the buyer with a manufacturer's warranty from defects in 
material and workmanship, under normal use and service, for one year after delivery to 
the owner, or 1000 operating hours, whichever occurs first. (R. 23). A copy of 
Vermeer's Limited Warranty is included in the Appendix as Exhibit B. 
Vermeer's Limited Warranty expressly disclaims all implied warranties: 
This warranty and any possible liability of Vermeer 
Manufacturing Company hereunder is in lieu of all other 
warranties, express, implied, or statutory, including, but not 
limited to, any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a 
particular purpose. 
(R. 23) (emphasis added). Johnson agreed to the terms of the Limited Warranty 
by filling out and signing the Warranty Registration Form. Johnson expressly 
acknowledged it was "familiar with the Limited Warranty Statement in the 
operator's manual." (R. 21). The Warranty Registration Form is included in the 
Appendix as Exhibit C. 
On March 28, 2003, Johnson filed a lawsuit alleging the failure of the Model T855 
trencher sold by Vermeer's independent, authorized dealer. In its Complaint, Johnson 
alleged "the trencher became wholly disabled as a result of a mechanical failure . . . " 
over three years after its purchase (R. 4). Johnson asserted causes of action for strict 
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liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose 
and merchantability. (R. 2-4). Johnson's Complaint sought general and special damages, 
including recovery for lost profits. (R. 4). The Complaint did not seek damages with 
respect to any personal injuries incurred or damage to any property other than the 
trencher itself. See id. 
On May 13, 2003, Vermeer filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: (1) 
Johnson's strict liability and negligence claims were barred by the economic loss rule; 
and (2) Johnson's breach of warranty claim was barred because the implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose were expressly disclaimed by 
Vermeer's Limited Warranty. (R. 9-27). 
After full briefing, the District Court Judge, Lynn W. Davis, ruled in favor of 
Vermeer and entered an Order Granting Vermeer's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice on 
July 30, 2003. Johnson now appeals from that Order of Dismissal. (R. 49-50, 62). 
Copies of Judge Davis' Ruling on Defendant Vermeer's Motion to Dismiss and Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice are included in the Appendix as Exhibit D. 
Johnson now appeals the dismissal of its strict liability and breach of implied 
warranty claims. Johnson does not appeal the dismissal of its negligence claim, which 
the trial court ruled was also barred by the economic loss rule. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not commit reversible error in finding that Johnson's claims 
were barred. Johnson is not entitled to relief under the facts alleged in its Complaint, or 
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any set of facts, for two reasons: first, the economic loss rule bars Johnson's strict 
liability claim; and second, Johnson's breach of warranty claims are barred because the 
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose were expressly 
disclaimed by Vermeer. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling 
dismissing Johnson's Complaint with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Economic Loss Rule Bars Johnson's Strict Liability Claim, 
Johnson argues that its strict liability claim was improperly dismissed by the trial 
court because it properly plead all necessary elements of a strict liability claim under 
section 402 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979). Johnson, however, entirely 
ignores the complete defense provided by the economic loss rule raised by Vermeer in its 
motion to dismiss, and relied upon by the trial court in dismissing Johnson's strict 
liability claim. Whether Johnson properly plead the elements for a strict liability claim, 
therefore, is irrelevant. The proper issue before the Court is whether the trial court 
correctly determined that Johnson's strict liability claim is barred by the economic loss 
rule. 
Under Utah law, Johnson cannot recover from Vermeer under the theory of strict 
liability for economic losses (i.e. lost profits, repair costs to the product itself) because 
the economic loss rule precludes recovery of such damages under tort theories of liability. 
Utah courts adhere to the majority position that a plaintiff may not recover economic 
losses under a theory of non-intentional tort. See American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI 
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Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996); see also, e^g., East River Steamship Corp. 
v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866-75 (1986). Economic loss is defined as: 
damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the 
defective product, or consequent loss of profits—without any claim 
of personal injury or damage to other property . . . as well as the 
"diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in 
quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was 
manufactured and sold." 
American Towers Owners Association, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 
(Utah 1996), quoting Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 
579-80 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added). In other words, under Utah law, 
economic damages are not recoverable in strict liability absent damage to property other 
than the subject product or bodily injury. 
Johnson's Complaint sought general and special damages, as well as recovery of 
lost profits during the time period that Johnson was allegedly unable to use the trencher 
in its normal course of business. (R. 1-3). The Complaint did not seek damages with 
respect to any personal injuries incurred by anyone or damage to property other than the 
trencher itself. However, Utah law squarely prohibits product purchasers from suing in 
tort to recover purely economic losses arising from disputes governed by contract law. 
See SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Venutlett & Associates, Inc., 28 P.2d 669 (Utah 
2001); American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 
1996). 
The seminal case in Utah addressing the application of the economic loss rule is 
American Towers Owners Association, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 
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(Utah 1996). In that case, the American Towers Condominium Association filed suit 
against a number of defendants, alleging that the defendants negligently failed to properly 
design, construct, and supervise the construction of the condominium complex. See id. at 
1188. The condominium association claimed economic losses resulting from design and 
construction defects in the plumbing and mechanical systems of the condominium 
complex, but did not allege personal injury or damage to property apart from the complex 
itself. See id. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the 
plaintiffs negligence claims, stating that "economic damages are not recoverable in [tort] 
absent physical property damage or bodily injury." IcL at 1188-92; see also Schafir v. 
Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating that home purchasers could not 
recover economic losses based upon defects caused by allegedly negligent construction 
of home). 
In American Towers, the Utah Supreme Court explained the public policy behind 
the economic loss rule as follows: 
When a product does not perform or last as long as the consumer 
thinks it should, the claim pertains to the quality of the product as 
measured by the buyer's and user's expectations—expectations 
which emanate solely from the purchase transaction. Thus, contract 
principles resolve issues when the product does not meet the user's 
expectations, while tort principles resolve issues when the product is 
unsafe to person or property. 
Id. at 1190. The economic loss rule "arises from intrinsic differences between tort and 
contract law." Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 580 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). "Contract law protects expectancy interests created through agreement 
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between the parties, while tort law protects individuals and their property from physical 
harm by imposing a duty to exercise reasonable care." Id 
Johnson's strict liability claim is precisely the kind of claim that the economic loss 
rule is designed to preclude. Johnson purchased a Model T855 trencher that came with a 
manufacturer's Limited Warranty for one full year after delivery to the owner, or 1000 
operating hours, whichever occurred first. Johnson contends that over three years after 
purchase, the trencher "became wholly disabled as a result of a mechanical failure of the 
trencher caused by defect flaws in the design." (R. 4). Johnson did not contend that any 
physical injuries were sustained as a result of the alleged defect, nor did Johnson seek 
reimbursement for any property damage other than damage to the trencher itself. Instead, 
Johnson merely sought damages caused by an allegedly defective trencher that became 
disabled. These allegations must be adjudicated exclusively in the world of contract and 
warranty law. Johnson may not circumvent the legal regime applicable to the purchase of 
the trencher by casting its claims in tort. Johnson's strict liability is legally barred. 
Hence, the trial court correctly granted Vermeer's motion to dismiss Johnson's strict 
liability claim based upon the economic loss rule. 
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B. Vermeer's Limited Warranty Effectively Disclaimed the Implied 
Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for a Particular Purpose. 
In its Complaint, Johnson asserted a claim for breach of the implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. However, the implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose were both expressly disclaimed by 
Vermeer in the Limited Warranty that Johnson received and acknowledged on the date 
the trencher was purchased. 
Section 70A-2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by the Utah 
legislature, provides that "to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability 
or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must 
be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion 
must be by a writing and conspicuous." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(2) (2003). The 
Limited Warranty provides in relevant part, "This warranty and any possible liability of 
Vermeer Manufacturing Company hereunder is in lieu of all other warranties, express, 
implied, or statutory, including, but not limited to, any warranties of merchantability or 
fitness for a particular purpose." The Limited Warranty conspicuously and expressly 
excludes the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability according to the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(2). 
Moreover, Johnson explicitly agreed to the terms of the limited warranty by filling 
out and signing the warranty registration form on the date the trencher was purchased. 
2 
Paragraph 15 of the Complaint states, "Defendant Vermeer Manufacturing Co.'s trencher was not fit for the 
ordinary purpose for which the trencher was to be used and was unmerchantable within the meaning of § 78-2-14 
(sic), nor was the gear box, pump and shaft assembly and their component parts fit for the particular purpose for 
which they were designed within the meaning of § 70A-2-315." (R. 3). 
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By signing the warranty registration form, Johnson, through its agent, expressly 
acknowledged familiarity with the Limited Warranty, including the disclaimer of implied 
warranties. 
Despite this, Johnson argues it never specifically agreed or assented to be bound 
by Vermeer's disclaimer. Under Utah law, a disclaimer of warranties is effective where 
the seller conspicuously and expressly excludes warranties of fitness and merchantability. 
Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford, Inc., 681 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1984). To 
properly disclaim warranties of merchantability, the disclaimer must specifically mention 
merchantability. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(2). With respect to warranties of fitness, 
"[l]anguage is sufficient to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it 
states, for example, that 'There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on 
the face hereof" Id. Even where the disclaimer is relatively inconspicuous, the Utah 
Supreme Court has explained that the disclaimer will nevertheless be binding on the 
buyer if "the provision was actually called to his attention." Christopher v. Larson Ford 
Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Utah 1976). 
The decision in Rawson v. K & K Sales, Inc., 2001 UT 24, 20 P.2d 876 (Utah 
2001) is instructive to the disclaimer issue presented here. In Rawson, plaintiffs James 
and Rebecca Rawson purchased a salvage-titled van from defendant K & K Sales. 
Plaintiffs signed a sales contract acknowledging the vehicle came with "no warranties, 
express or implied, including but not limited to any implied warranty of merchantability 
[or] fitness for a particular purpose." Id. at 886. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
trial court's grant of defendant's summary judgment motion on plaintiffs' claims for 
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breach of implied warranties finding that the implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose were expressly excluded by disclaimers in the sales 
documents plaintiffs signed. Id. 
Here, as in Rawson, the language of the disclaimer complies with the requirements 
of Section 70A-2-316, and the provision was specifically called to Johnson's attention as 
evidenced by the signature of its agent on the warranty registration form. There is no 
evidence to suggest that Johnson, a professional trenching company, was unfamiliar 
with commercial practices or warranty provisions when it's agent signed the warranty 
registration form. 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has held that where the buyer accepts a 
disclaimer in exchange for coverage under the limited warranty, it is binding on the 
parties. See Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 2002 UT 83, 54 P.3d 1131 (finding that disclaimer 
was valid where, upon signing the contract, 10 days after tendering purchase price, buyer 
became entitled to delivery of goods and coverage under limited warranty). Here, 
Johnson signed the warranty registration form, thereby agreeing to the disclaimer of 
implied warranties in consideration for coverage under the Limited Warranty. 
Under these authorities, the implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose 
and merchantability were effectively disclaimed by Vermeer's Limited Warranty. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed Johnson's cause of action for breach of 
implied warranties. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly dismissed Johnson's Complaint. Johnson's claims are 
legally barred by the economic loss doctrine and disclaimer of implied warranties. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling granting Vermeer's Motion 
to Dismiss with Prejudice. 
ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Vermeer's 
appendix of important documents is bound as part of this brief. 
DATED this ffi* day of May, 2004. 
Snell & Wilmer LLP 
Todd M. Shaughnessy 
Kamie F. Brown 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee 
Vermeer Manufacturing Co. 
297123 1 
19 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed, postage prepaid 
this 24th day of May, 2004, to the following: 
Thomas W. Seiler 
ROBINSON SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo,Utah 84603-1266 
297123 1 
13 
TABLE OF CONTENTS TO 
APPENDIX TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Tab Description 
A. Complete text of Utah Code. Ann. § 70A-2-316(2) (2003); Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56 
B. Vermeer's Limited Warranty for Industrial Equipment 
C. Vermeer Equipment Limited Warranty 
D. Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice 
299584 1 
Tab A 
1277 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 70A-2-316 
70A-2-310. Open time for payment or running of credit 
— Authority to ship under reservation. 
Unless otherwise agreed 
(a) payment is due at the time and place at which the 
buyer is to receive the goods even though the place of 
shipment is the place of delivery; and 
(b) if the seller is authorized to send the goods he may 
ship them under reservation, and may tender the docu-
ments of title, but the buyer may inspect the goods after 
their arrival before payment is due unless such inspection 
is inconsistent with the terms of the contract (Section 
70A-2-513); and 
(c) if delivery is authorized and made by way of docu-
ments of title otherwise than by Subsection (b) then 
payment is due at the time and place at which the buyer 
is to receive the documents regardless of where the goods 
are to be received; and 
(d) where the seller is required or authorized to ship 
the goods on credit the credit period runs from the time of 
shipment but postdating the invoice or delaying its dis-
patch will correspondingly delay the starting of the credit 
per iod. 1965 
70A-2'311. Options and cooperation respect ing perfor-
mance. 
(1) An agreement for sale which is otherwise sufficiently 
definite (Subsection (3) of Section 76A-2-204) to be a contract 
is not made invalid by the fact that it leaves particulars of 
performance to be specified by one of the parties. Any such 
specification must be made in good faith and within limits set 
by commercial reasonableness. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed specifications relating to as-
sortment of the goods are at the buyer's option and except as 
otherwise provided in Subsections (l)(c) and (3) of Section 
70A-2'319 specifications or arrangements relating to ship-
ment are at the seller's option. 
(3) Where such specification would materially affect the 
other party's performance but is not seasonably made or 
where one party's cooperation is necessary to the agreed 
performance of the other but is not seasonably forthcoming, 
the other party in addition to all other remedies 
(a) is excused for any resulting delay in his own perfor-
mance; and 
(b) may also either proceed to perform in any reason-
able manner or after the time for a material part of his 
own performance treat the failure to specify or to cooper-
ate as a breach by failure to deliver or accept the goods. 
1965 
70A-2-312. Warranty of title and against infringement 
— Buyer's obligation against infringement. 
(1) Subject to Subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a 
warranty by the seller that 
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer 
rightful; and 
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security 
interest or other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer 
at the time of contracting "has no knowledge. 
(2) A warranty imder Subsection (1) will be excluded or 
modified only by specific language or by circumstances which 
give the buyer reason to know that the person selling does not 
claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such 
right or title as he or a third person may have. 
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant 
regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the goods 
shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person 
by way of infringement or the like but a buyer who furnishes 
specifications to the seller must hold the seller harmless 
against any such claim which arises out of compliance with 
the specifications. 1965 
70A-2--313. Express warranties by affirmation, prom-
ise, description, sample. 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the 
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes 
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express war-
ranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or 
promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of 
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that 
the goods shall conform to the description. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis 
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole 
of the goods shall conform to the sample or model 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express war-
ranty that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or 
"guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a 
warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods 
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or 
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. 1965 
70A-2-314. Implied warranty — Merchantability — Us-
age of trade. 
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 70A-2-316), a 
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a 
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect 
to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value 
of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or 
elsewhere is a sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the con-
tract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average 
quality within the description; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such 
goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agree-
ment, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit 
and among all units involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as 
the agreement may require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made 
on the container or label if any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 70A-2-316) other 
implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage 
of trade. 1965 
70A-2-315. Implied warranty — Fitness for particular 
purpose. 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to 
know 9-^-Y particular purpose for which the goods are required 
and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment 
to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or 
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the 
goods shall be fit for such purpose. 1965 
70A-2-316. Exclusion or modification of warranties — 
Livestock. 
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express 
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit 
warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consis-
tent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this 
chapter on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 70A-2-202) 
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such 
construction is unreasonable. 
(2) Subject to Subsection (3), to exclude or modify the 
implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the 
language must mention merchantability and in case of a 
writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any 
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing 
A-2-317 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1278 
1 conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties 
itness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are 
warranties which extend beyond the description on the face 
•eof." 
3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2) 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all 
implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as 
is," "with all faults" or other language which in common 
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion 
of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied 
warranty; and 
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract 
has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as 
he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no 
implied warranty with regard to defects which an exam-
ination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to 
him; and 
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modi-
fied by course of dealing or course of performance or usage 
of trade. 
i) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in 
ordance with the provisions of this chapter on liquidation 
[imitation of damages and on contractual modification of 
ledy (Sections 70A-2-718 and 70A-2-719). 
5) If a contract for the sale of livestock, which may include 
tie, hogs, sheep, and horses, does not contain a written 
tement as to warranty of merchantability or fitness for a 
ticular purpose, there shall be no implied warranty that 
livestock are free from disease and sickness at the time of 
sale and the seller shall not be liable for damages arising 
-n the lack of merchantability or fitness for a particular 
•pose. 1981 
^-2-317. C u m u l a t i o n a n d conflict of w a r r a n t i e s ex-
p r e s s o r impl ied . 
Varranties whether express or implied shall be construed 
consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such 
struction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall 
ermine which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that 
2ntion the following rules apply: 
(a) Exact of technical specifications displace an incon-
sistent sample or model or general language of descrip-
tion. 
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsis-
tent general language of description. 
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied 
warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose. 1965 
^-2-318. T h i r d - p a r t y benef ic ia r ies of w a r r a n t i e s ex-
p r e s s o r impl ied . 
i seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to 
r person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume 
)e affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the 
rranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of 
3 section with respect to injury to the person of an individ-
to whom the warranty extends. 1977 
^-2-319. F.O.B. a n d F.A.S. t e r m s . 
1) Unless otherwise agreed the term F.O.B. (which means 
>e on board") at a named place, even though used only in 
nection with the stated price, is a delivery term under 
ich 
(a) when the term is F.O.B. the place of shipment, the 
seller must at that place ship the goods in the manner 
provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-504) and bear the 
expense and risk of putting them into the possession of 
the carrier; or 
(b) when the term is F.O.B. the place of destination, the 
seller must at his own expense and risk transport the 
goods to that place and there tender delivery of them in 
the manner provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-503)-
(c) when under either (a) or (b) the term is also F.O.B. 
vessel, car or other vehicle, the seller must in addition at 
his own expense and risk load the goods on board. If the 
term is F.O.B. vessel the buyer must name the vessel and 
in an appropriate case the seller must comply with the 
provisions of this chapter on the form of bill of lading 
(Section 70A-2-323). 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed the term FA.S. vessel (which 
means "free alongside") at a named port, even though used 
only in connection with the stated price, is a delivery term 
under which the seller must 
(a) at his own expense and risk deliver the goods 
alongside the vessel in the manner usual in that port or on 
a dock designated and provided by the buyer; and 
(b) obtain and tender a receipt for the goods in ex-
change for which the carrier is under a duty to issue a bill 
of lading. 
(3) Unless otherwise agreed in any case falling within 
Subsection (l)(a) or (c) or Subsection (2) the buyer must 
seasonably give any needed instructions for making delivery, 
including when the term is FA.S. or F.O.B. -the loading berth 
of the vessel and in an appropriate case its name and sailing 
date. The seller may treat the failure of needed instructions as 
a failure of co-operation under this chapter (Section 70A-2-
311). He may also at his option move the goods in any 
reasonable manner preparatory to delivery or shipment. 
(4) Under the term F.O.B. vessel or FA.S. unless otherwise 
agreed the buyer must make payment against tender of the 
required documents and the seller may not tender nor the 
buyer demand delivery of the goods in substitution for the 
documents. 1965 
70A-2-320. C.I.F. a n d C.&F. t e rms . 
(1) The term C.I.F. means that the price includes in a lump 
sum the cost of the goods and the insurance and freight to the 
named destination. The term C.&F. or C.F. means that the 
price so includes cost and freight to the named destination. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed and even though used only in 
connection with the stated price and destination, the term 
C.I.F. destination or its equivalent requires the seller at his 
own expense and risk to 
(a) put the goods into the possession of a carrier at the 
port for shipment and obtain a negotiable bill or bills of 
lading covering the entire transportation to the named 
destination; and 
(b) load the goods and obtain a receipt from the carrier 
(which may be contained in the bill of lading) showing 
that the freight has been paid or provided for; and 
(c) obtain a policy or certificate of insurance, including 
any war risk insurance, of a kind and on terms then 
current at the port of shipment in the usual amount, m 
the currency of the contract, shown to cover the same 
goods covered by the bill of lading and providing for 
payment of loss to the order of the buyer or for the account 
of whom it may concern; but the seller may add to the 
price the amount of the premium for any such war risk 
insurance; and 
(d) prepare an invoice of the goods and procure any 
other documents required to effect shipment or to comply 
with the contract; and 
(e) forward and tender with commercial promptness all 
the documents in due form and with any indorsement 
necessary to perfect the buyer's rights. 
(3) Unless otherwise agreed the term C.&F or its equiva-
lent has the same effect and imposes upon the seller the same 
obligations and risks as a C.I.F. term except the obligation as 
to insurance. 
Cited in Walker v. Carlson, 740 R2d 1372 Ct. App. 1994); Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Stavros v. Office of Leg-
1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Rimensburger v. islative Research & Gen. Counsel, 2000 UT 63, 
Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 15 P.3d 1013. 
1992); Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876 (Utah 
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by s tatute or order of the 
court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service 
of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty 
days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. 
A party serv-ed with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer 
thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply 
to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer 
or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the 
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this 
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by 
order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a 
pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days 
after notice of the court's action; 
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the 
more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: 
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insuflSciency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to 
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the 
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim 
for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for 
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on 
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders 
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably 
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more 
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall 
point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is 
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of 
the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike 
the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems 
just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court 
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redun-
dant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule 
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a 
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses 
and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, 
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or 
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not 
presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure 
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal 
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or 
by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and 
except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise 
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss 
the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as 
provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after 
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a 
waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination 
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the. 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.) 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 2000 amend- and made stylistic changes throughout, 
ment in Subdivision (a) added the language Compiler's Notes . — This rule is similar to 
beginning "within the state and within thirty Rule 12, F.R.C.P. 
days" at the end of the first sentence and "but a Cross-References. — Motions generally, 
motion directed" at the end of the last sentence, U.R.C.P. 7. 
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Jurisdict ion over the person. 
When urging the trial court to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction based only on documentary 
evidence, a plaintiff must make only a prima 
facie showing that the trial court has personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in 
order to proceed to trial on the merits. Ander-
son v. American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 807 
P.2d 825 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 
900, 112 S. Ct. 276, 116 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1991). 
Trial court erred in granting a Nevada casi-
no's motion to dismiss a Utah patron's personal 
injury suit, where the patron's complaint al-
leged sufficient facts to support general per-
sonal jurisdiction over the casino by the State of 
Utah. Ho v. Jim's Enters. , Inc., 2001 UT 63, 29 
P.3d 633. 
Motion for judgment on pleadings . 
Motion for judgment on the pleadings to 
decide upon distribution of trust assets was 
inappropriate in a proceeding among trust ben-
eficiaries to determine distribution and offsets. 
Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT App 105, 46 P.3d 
233. 
—Matters outs ide of p leadings . 
Answers to interrogatories . 
Answers to interrogatories are not a part of 
vere properly set aside where trial court failed Time for appea l . 
o obtain jurisdiction over defendant because Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
lummons was not timely issued Fibreboard from a default judgment in a city court ran from 
3aper Piods Corp v Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, the date of notice of entry of such judgment, 
*75 P2d 1005 (1970) rather than from the date of judgment Buck-
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action,
 n e r v Mam Realty & Ins Co , 4 Utah 2d 124, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 288 P2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank & 
ground tha t their counsel had an already Tr U s t Co v Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d) 
scheduled appearance m another court on that 
late, but due to fact that there were no law or Ci ted in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods Corp v 
notion days between time objection was filed Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P2d 703 (1965), 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re- J P W Enters , Inc v Naef, 604 P2d 486 (Utah 
Pusal to set aside default judgment entered 1979), Katz v Pierce, 732 P2d 92 (Utah 1986), 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date Lund v Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P3d 277 
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v 
Hammon, 560 P2d 1375 (Utah 1977) 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served m accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just . Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fe-es, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Compi le r ' s Notes . — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, F R C P . 
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§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq 
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VERMEER EQUIPMENT LIMITED WARRANTY 
VERMEER MANUFACTURING COMPANY, hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Manufacturer", warrants each 
new industrial product of its own manufacture to be free from defects in material and workmanship, under normal 
use and service for one full year after delivery to the owner or 1000 operating hours, whichever occurs first. During 
the warranty period, the authorized selling Vermeer Dealer shall furnish parts without charge for any Vermeer 
product that fails because of defects in material and workmanship. Warranty is void unless warranty registration 
card is returned within ten days from the date of purchase. This warranty and any passible liability of Vermeer 
Manufacturing Company hereunder is in lieu of all other warranties, express, implied, or statutory, including, but not 
limited to, any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. 
The parties agree that the Buyer's SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE REMEDY against Manufacturer, whether in contract or 
arising out of warranties, representations, instructions, or defects shall be for the replacement or repair of defective 
parts as provided herein. In no event shall Manufacturer's liability exceed the purchase price of the product. The 
Buyer agrees that no other remedy (including, but not limited to, incidental or consequential loss) shall be available 
to him. if, during the warranty period, any product becomes defective by reason of material or workmanship and 
Buyer immediately notifies Manufacturer of such defect, Manufacturer shall, at its option, supply a replacement part 
or request return of the product to its plant in Pella, Iowa. Wo parts shall be returned without prior written 
authorization From Manufacturer, and this Warranty does not obligate the Manufacturer to bear any transportaton 
charges in connection with the repair or replacement of defective parts. The Vermeer Manufacturing Company will 
not accept any charges for labor and/or parts incidental to the removal or remounting of parts repaired or replaced 
under this Warranty. 
This Warranty shall not apply to any pari or product which shall have been installed or operated in a manner not 
recommended by the Vermeer Manufacturing Company, nor to any part or product which shall have been 
neglected, or used in any way which, in the Manufacturer's opinion, adversely affects its performance; nor 
negligence of proper maintenance or other negligence, fire or other accident; nor with respect to wear items 
included but not limited to items such as backhoe bucket teeth, digger chain, sprocket, cutters and bases, dirt 
augers and sprocket, drive chains and sprockets, plow blades, seats, brake pads, cutter wheel and segments, 
trench cleaners, tree spade blades and wear strips, stump cutter wheel, pockets and teeth, brush chipper knives, 
fan belts, water hoses, lights on light kits; nor if the unit has been altered or repaired outside of a Vermeer 
Manufacturing Company authorized dealership in a manner of which, in the sole judgment of Vermeer 
Manufacturing Company affects its performance, stability or reliability; nor with respect to batteries which are 
covered under a separate adjustment warranty; nor to any product in which parts not manufactured or approved by 
the Manufacturer have been used, nor to normal maintenance services or replacement of normal service items. 
Equipment and accessories not of our manufacture are warranted only to the extent of the original Manufacturer's 
Warranty and subject to their allowance to us, if found defective by them. 
Vermeer Manufacturing Company reserves the right to modify, alter, and improve any product or parts without 
incurring any obligation to replace any product or parts previously sold with such modified, altered, or improved 
product or part. 
No person is authorized to give any other Warranty, or to assume any additionaJ obligation on the Manufacturer's 
behalf unless made in wnting, and signed by an officer of the Manufacturer. 
VERMEER MANUFACTURING COMPANY 
Pella, Iowa 
T855 Trencher 
TabC 
Model, 
Customer Type _i_ 
ffc~?~- LIMITED WARRANTY FOR INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT 
. Pnmary Use. ~zr 
(See Market Claserficabans Below) 
NOTE; To validate warranty coverage, thra form must be 
filed out, 3ignedr and returned at the tms of delivery to first 
owner. This report will not be acceptable if incomplete or 
falsified in any way. ~y_ i &^ {\& 
Delivery date 
Dealer Loc. St C 
Owner/Cornpajiv^__f^ :r Jj&sy'SfrS < > A 
Company Contact /jyty&CT*} Zmfa/.rvAS 
Contact Title ^ - J<&? > " 
Address />*C Y { 1 7-
CountY _." City &/fr><4(^///TZ 
Stata/Prov t*£T~ Zip/Post Code^ 
Country ^LT^L ^ 
Tat 
</6*J 
42lT- 4/?#-±°3e 
Fax 
Attachment
 m 
Attachment 
. Sena! #_ 
. Serial # 
I trie owner, hereby acknowledge that 
(have rece«vBd and will read tfm operator's manual 
before operating or Servicing the machine. 
1 have road and understand trie Mriety deoate on 
the machine and safety fnstaictians In tha manual. 
ThB daaiflr explained safety, operation, and service 
Of tha machine. 
f am femiliar with the Limited Warranty Statement 
In tha operator's manual. 
I have bean rad vised and understand that dealers 
are Independent dealers and not agents or 
employees of Varrnaer Msnufactunng Company 
and therefore hava no authority to make 
representations on behalf of Varrnaer 
Manufacturing Corrrp/iay. 
Owners Signature ~}lf^"*r { ' "~~ 
Pnnt Narna fi A & r & £ h O > ,\bA*3S0A 
I. tha deader, acknowledge that: 
l have provided the owner with tha operator's 
manual and have Instructed him concerning safety, 
proper operation, service, and tha Limited 
Warranty of the machine. 
I have examined the machine according to the 
predelivery check sheet contained in the operator's 
manual and, having made ail neceaasry 
adjustments, find the machine ready for customer 
fleid use. j ^+ u 
Defter signature j ^ y L - j - >^ C-^^—^***^ 
Salesperson' ^ > g r a f r e t / ^/Any^/C 
\\ 
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IN THE FOURTH JTJDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
C A JOHNSON TRENCHING, L C, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
VERMEER MANUFACTURING CO, 
Defendant 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Civil No 030401491 
Judge Lynn W Davis 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss The Court havinj 
read the Motions of the Parties now makes the following ruling 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1 Plaintiff C A Johnson Trenching, L C purchased a Model T855 trencher, Serial No 
102, from defendant Vermeer Manufacturing Company's mdependent authorized dealer in Salt 
Lake City on July 19, 1999 
2 On March 28, 2003, plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that the Model T855 trencher 
sold by Vermeer's independent authorized dealer m Salt Lake City "became wholly disabled as a 
result of mechanical failure" on September 24, 2002, over three years after it purchase 
ANALYSIS 
It is well settled that a plaintiff cannot recover economic losses for strict liability or 
negligence claims absent damage to property other than the subject product or bodily injury 
American Towers Owners Association Inc v CCI Mechanical Inc , 930 P 2d 1182 (Utah 1996] 
In this case, plaintiff does not allege property damage or bodily injury As such plaintiffs claim 
for economic loss under the theories of strict liability and negligence fails 
Section 70A-2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by the Utah legislature, 
provides that "to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the 
language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to 
exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by writing and 
conspicuous." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(2) (2002). In this case, the limited warranty signed 
by the plaintiff expressly disclaims the implied warranty of merchantability and the implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The plaintiff offered no case law to refuie the proper 
disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability and the implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose. Furthermore, the defendant properly followed the directives of the Uniform 
Commercial Code and specifically mentioned in writing the two implied warranties. 
CONCLUSION AND RULING 
Because the Court finds that plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
defendant Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
DATED this / / day of July, 2003. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 03 0401491 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail KAMIE F BROWN 
ATTORNEY DEF 
15 WEST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SUITE 12 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Mail THOMAS W SEILER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
8 0 NORTH 100 EAST 
P.O. BOX 1266 
PROVO UT 84603-1266 
Dated this day 
Jaae _ isr" 
Todd M. Shaughnessy (6651) 
Kamie F Brown (8520) 
Snell & Wilmer LLP 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 257-1800 
c ?2 
Attorneys for Defendant Vermeer Manufacturing Co. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
C.A. JOHNSON TRENCHING, L.C , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VERMEER MAMJFACTURTNG CO., 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Case No. 030401491 
Division 9 
Based upon the motion of Defendant Vermeer Manufacturing, Co , supporting and 
opposing papers, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion be and hereby is granted, and that 
the above-captioned matter be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 30 day of July, 2002 pM^AL. IF /fy 
BY THE CO' 
Approval as to Form: 
Thomas W. Seller 
.10BJNSON SELLER &. GLAZIER 
»o03ia 
